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WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN IRELAND AT A CROSSROADS:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
BRIAN M. BARRY
Abstract: The Workplace Relations Act 2015 fundamentally reformed the workplace dispute
resolution system in Ireland–the centrepiece being the Workplace Relations Commission, the
new body for first-instance dispute resolution. While the overall system is an improvement on
its overly-complex and confusing predecessor, the Supreme Court’s decision in Zalewski v An
Adjudication Officer declaring aspects of adjudication at the WRC unconstitutional, coupled
with user representatives’ persistent concerns about how adjudication is conducted, present
ongoing challenges.
This article describes the results of a survey undertaken in 2019 by the author of over one
hundred representatives’ views on the system, and contextualises them in light of Zalewski.
Based on findings from the survey—the third in a series of such surveys since 2011–and the
requirement to amend WRC adjudication processes following Zalewski, the author suggests
that the WRC could reframe how it presents and delivers its dispute resolution services at first
instance to help better serve workers and employers in dispute. Specifically, the WRC could
enhance its Mediation Service both in terms of how mediation is presented and how it is
delivered, so that it is perceived by users and representatives as a mainstay dispute resolution
mechanism rather than as a secondary offering to the Adjudication Service. Such a recalibration
could help achieve a better balance of informal, flexible dispute resolution through mediation
in tandem with constitutionally-compliant adjudication with more robust procedures.
Keywords: workplace dispute resolution – workplace adjudication – workplace mediation –
employment law – survey

INTRODUCTION
The year 2015 was a landmark for employment law and industrial relations in Ireland. The
Workplace Relations Act 2015 (the “2015 Act”) fundamentally reformed the system for
resolving workplace disputes, dissolving a convoluted, inefficient and often confusing system
comprising several State agencies, sometimes with overlapping jurisdiction, into a streamlined
two-tier structure. The 2015 Act established a new first-instance dispute resolution body, the
Workplace Relations Commission (WRC), and allocated a substantially increased jurisdiction
to the Labour Court to serve as an appellate forum for all statutory employment rights disputes.
The background to the reform agenda and the new system introduced by the 2015 Act is wellcharted territory, being the subject of extensive commentary from academics and practitioners. 1
Reform was a welcome and necessary step, although the 2015 Act came in for considerable
criticism both during its passage through the Oireachtas and after its enactment.2 One central
1

A comprehensive synopsis is provided by Anthony Kerr, “The Workplace Relations Reform Project” (2016) 7
European Labour Law Journal 126.
2
Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, “Blueprint to Deliver A World-Class Workplace Relations
Service” (2012) available at www.workplacerelations.ie/en/publications_forms/blueprint_for_a_world-
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criticism, more often than not levelled by experienced employment law and industrial relations
law practitioners, was that the processes within the 2015 Act regulating first-instance
adjudication at the WRC Adjudication Service were inconsistent and unpredictable. A subset
of these practitioners argued that such processes fell short of procedural safeguards enshrined
in the Irish Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
These criticisms proved to be prescient. The provisions of the 2015 Act that regulate
adjudication before an adjudication officer at the WRC were the subject of a partially
successful constitutional challenge in Zalewski v An Adjudication Officer.3 In April 2021, the
Supreme Court found, inter alia that the effective blanket ban on WRC hearings in public, and
the absence of powers for adjudication officers to require that certain evidence be given on oath
or affirmation, were inconsistent with the Constitution.
The Supreme Court decision in Zalewski has important ramifications for how first-instance
adjudication is delivered within the system. It also serves as a punctuation mark–a suitable time
to appraise the reform project and the new system introduced by the 2015 Act. This article
examines the system’s initial successes and failures and offers suggestions for how the system
could be improved. To do so, it relies on data from a survey study the author undertook in 2019
of over one hundred professionals who represent clients in the workplace dispute resolution
system on their views on aspects of the system. 4 It is the third in a series of survey studies by
the author–the first was conducted in 2011 before the reforms were introduced, the second in
2016 in the aftermath of the reforms. The results from the first two surveys and their
consequences for the reform agenda are examined in an earlier article which the Supreme Court
referred to and relied upon in Zalewski.5 Together, the three surveys from 2011, 2016 and 2019
combine, longitudinally, to capture shifting perspectives on the new system and comparisons
with the system that preceded it. The survey data also provides a useful lens through which to
reflect on how constitutional frailties at the WRC identified in the Zalewski judgment ought to
be addressed, and more broadly, to consider ways to improve the system after a number of
years in operation.
The article is set out in three parts. Part 1 outlines the Supreme Court judgment in Zalewski
insofar as it addresses the constitutionality of the 2015 Act’s provisions governing the
processes of adjudication at the WRC. Although the Supreme Court’s decision has broader
consequences beyond adjudication procedures at the WRC–both for adjudicative bodies in
areas other than in workplace relations and for the nature and boundaries of judicial power in
class_workplace_relations_service.pdf [Accessed 21 July 2021]; Kevin Duffy, “Blueprint for Reform of
Employment Rights Institutions” (2012) 9 Irish Employment Law Journal 81; Tom Mallon, “Employment Law
Reform” (2012) 9 Irish Employment Law Journal 76; Tom Mallon, “A World-Class System? ” (2016) 21 The Bar
Review 71; Marguerite Bolger, “The Workplace Relations Bill: World-Class or Legally Flawed? ” (2015) 12 Irish
Employment Law Journal 21; Brian Barry, “The Workplace Relations Bill 2014: An Important Opportunity for
Workplace Relations Reform’ (2014) 11 Irish Employment Law Journal 106; Brian Barry, “Reforming the
Framework for Employment Litigation and Dispute Resolution in Ireland” (Trinity College Dublin, 2013); Kerr
(n.1); Anthony Kerr, “Changing Landscapes: The Juridification of the Labour Court? ” (2015) 53 Irish Jurist
(n.s.) 58. The 2015 Act came in for judicial criticism too. In Bondarenko v Employment Appeals Tribunal, Binchy
J. criticised the manner in which the 2015 Act transferred modes of redress for various employment rights
complaints and adjudicative functions from the old dispute resolution bodies to the WRC. He described how what
materialised was an “extraordinary labyrinth of legislation”, “convoluted”, and that it highlighted the “pitfalls of
legislation by amendment after amendment” [2019] IEHC 578, paras 63, 66 and 67.
3
[2021] IESC 24 and 29.
4
The findings of the study were first presented at the 22nd Annual Irish European Law Forum: Employment Law
in a Time of Uncertainty, UCD Sutherland School of Law, 6 December 2019.
5
Barry, “Surveying the Scene: How Representatives’ Views Informed a New Era in Irish Workplace Dispute
Resolution” (2018) 41 Dublin University Law Journal 45. The Supreme Court referred to this article at [2021]
IESC 24, para.22, per Charleton J. who noted the article was an “important academic contribution”, and para.28,
per O’Donnell J.
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Irish constitutional law—consideration of the Zalewski judgment here is confined to the
Supreme Court’s rulings on the four aspects of the WRC’s adjudication process that formed
the basis of the applicant’s complaints. They are that the 2015 Act breached his rights under
Art.40.3 of the Constitution because (i) there was no requirement that adjudication officers or
members of the Labour Court have any legal qualifications, training or experience; (ii) there
was no provision for an adjudication officer to administer an oath or affirmation and no
criminal sanction for a witness who gave false evidence before an adjudication officer; (iii)
there was no express provision made for the cross-examination of witnesses during
adjudication hearings; and (iv) the proceedings before an adjudication officer were held
otherwise than in public.
Part 2 details the 2019 survey of representatives. It describes the background to this survey,
putting it in the context of the earlier surveys from 2011 and 2016, and briefly outlines the
methodology employed in the survey. It then sets out the results of the 2019 survey, broken
down into four main areas that participants were asked to consider: (i) complaints management
at the WRC; (ii) adjudication at the WRC; (iii) mediation at the WRC; and (iv) operations at
the Labour Court.
Part 3 suggests ways that the delivery of first-instance dispute resolution at the WRC can
be improved based on the results of the 2019 survey and accounting for the Supreme Court’s
decision in Zalewski. To briefly preview the main points of this analysis: in light of the
necessary levelling-up of procedural safeguards at the Adjudication Service through amending
legislation following Zalewski—specifically, that adjudication officers will have the power to
compel evidence to be given on oath or affirmation, and that adjudication hearings will be held
in public at least some, if not most of the time—it seems likely that adjudication at the WRC
may develop a more formal character. Consequently, it may be appropriate for the WRC to
consider recalibrating how it presents and delivers its various dispute resolution offerings at
first-instance, specifically, by allocating more resources to its Mediation Service and presenting
it as a mainstay mode of dispute resolution (rather than as a secondary alternative to
adjudication). Adjudication ought to be presented as one of two options alongside mediation,
rather than as the default, go-to mechanism for resolving complaints. Workplace dispute
resolution systems in the UK and in New Zealand, where mediation is offered as a mainstay
dispute resolution mechanism, rather than as an alternative to adjudication, are briefly
considered for comparative context, as is a mediation service that enjoyed success previously
in this area of law, the Equality Tribunal’s Mediation Service which operated from 2000 to
2015. The results of the survey data broadly suggest representatives’ support for such a
recalibration at the WRC whereby mediation and adjudication complement each other, and are
presented to service users as equals in terms of the dispute-resolution offering available at firstinstance.
We turn first to the case of Zalewski v An Adjudication Officer and its significant
consequences for workplace dispute resolution in Ireland.
1. ZALEWSKI V AN ADJUDICATION OFFICER
Zalewski v An Adjudication Officer concerned the constitutionality of aspects of adjudication
at the WRC Adjudication Service. The Supreme Court found that certain parts of the processes
set out in the 2015 Act regulating adjudication were unconstitutional in that they failed to
adequately protect the constitutional rights of complainants appearing before the WRC. The
decision precipitated amending legislation, the Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 2021 (the “2021 Act”), which amended the 2015 Act and other employment
legislation to ensure that constitutional frailties at first-instance adjudication are addressed. The
2021 Act is considered further below.
3

The applicant, Thomas Zalewski, was a security man and later a supervisor at a
convenience store in Dublin. Following a serious incident when the store was robbed with the
use of pepper spray and a gun which was discharged, the applicant was reprimanded by the
store manager for how he handled the incident. After a disciplinary meeting, he was summarily
dismissed on the ground of gross misconduct.
The applicant instituted two statutory claims for unfair dismissal and payment in lieu of
notice before the WRC. His experience of adjudication at the WRC was, by any measure,
unsatisfactory. A hearing before an adjudication officer was scheduled in October 2016
whereupon an adjournment was granted to the applicant’s former employer. A further hearing
was scheduled for December 2016. The parties attended in December and the adjudication
officer informed them that a decision had already issued in respect of the claim and that the
hearing date had been scheduled in error. The parties subsequently received a decision a few
days later dismissing the applicant’s claim, and which appeared to record a full hearing had
taken place even though it had not. 6
The applicant, dissatisfied with this process (and, as the Supreme Court acknowledged,
with some justification), 7 undertook judicial review proceedings seeking, inter alia,
declarations that the 2015 Act was repugnant to the Constitution insofar as processes
established under the 2015 Act for adjudication at the WRC did not protect his constitutional
rights under Art.40.3 of the Constitution, together with an order of certiorari quashing the
decision of the adjudication officer.
The applicant was unsuccessful before the High Court and was granted leave to appeal
directly to the Supreme Court.8 The two central issues that the court was asked to consider
were:
(i) whether adjudication before the WRC amounted to the administration of justice required by
Art.34 of the Constitution to be administered in courts and, if so, was such adjudication an
exercise of “limited functions and powers of a judicial nature” such that it was a permissible
delegation of judicial power to a body other than a court under Art.37; and,
(ii) whether the statutory framework adequately vindicated the rights of a complainant before
the WRC under the Constitution and ECHR.
On the first of these issues, the court held that adjudication before the WRC other than
cases under the Industrial Relations Act 1969 did indeed amount to the administration of justice
as envisaged by Art.34 of the Constitution, thereby reversing the decision of Simons J. in the
High Court, 9 and then held by a majority of 4:3 that the jurisdiction of adjudication by the
WRC satisfied the requirements of Art.37 in that its functions were “limited”. 10
On the second issue, the applicant complained that the processes for adjudication, set out
in Pt 4 of the 2015 Act, inadequately protected his rights under Art.40.3 of the Constitution on
four grounds:
(i) the qualifications of adjudication officers:
that there was no requirement that adjudication officers or members of the Labour Court have
any legal qualifications, training, or experience;
(ii) administering an oath or affirmation:

6

O’Donnell J. outlined that “The decision stated that the adjudication officer had ‘enquired into the complaints
and [given] the parties an opportunity to be heard … and to present … any evidence relevant to the complaints’”.
[2021] IESC 24, para.9
7
For example, Charleton J. described the process as “nothing short of dreadful” [2021] IESC 24, para.17.
8
[2020] IESCDET 93.
9
[2020] IEHC 178.
10
[2021] IESC 24, paras 110–133.
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that there was no provision for an adjudication officer to administer an oath or affirmation. 11
There was no criminal sanction for a witness who gave false evidence before an
adjudication officer;
(iii) cross-examination:
that there was no express provision made for the cross-examination of witnesses; and
(iv) public hearings
that the proceedings before an adjudication officer were held otherwise than in public. 12
The court agreed with the applicant’s complaints on the second ground, the absence of a
provision to take evidence under oath or affirmation, and the fourth ground, the default that
proceedings were held otherwise than in public.
On the first ground, the qualifications of adjudication officers, O’Donnell J. rejected
“unhesitatingly” the suggestion that adjudication officers must have the same formal legal
training and sufficient legal experience to be appointed judges. 13 Acknowledging that although
the range of decisions that the WRC may make can involve very complex areas of law, 14 there
was no justification for insisting that a law degree or experience as a practising lawyer ought
to be an essential qualification as a requirement of constitutional law. Courts and lawyers, as
he put it, “do not have a monopoly on fact-finding, or even the law’s application, and cannot
claim infallibility in either respect”. 15 Nevertheless, tellingly, O’Donnell J. warned that “the
standard of justice administered under Article 37 cannot be lower or less demanding than the
justice administered in courts under Article 34”. 16
O’Donnell J. also addressed another argument made by the appellant (although not made
as a separate ground of challenge) relating to how adjudication officers are susceptible to be
removed from their position by the executive branch. He noted that the unqualified power of
the Minister to revoke the appointment of adjudication officers was “troubling, particularly as
it is likely that the adjudication officers will be civil servants in the Minister’s department with
other responsibilities where they will routinely be required to accept direction”.17 Furthermore,
O’Donnell J. noted that membership of the Labour Court, regulated by the Industrial Relations
Acts 1946 and 1969, did not contain any express statement of the independence of members of
the Court. Both these issues, O’Donnell J. suggested, would “at a minimum, require careful
scrutiny”, in light of the court’s findings as to other constitutional flaws in the adjudication
process. 18
On the second ground, administering an oath or affirmation, O’Donnell J. set out why
compelling evidence to be given under oath or affirmation was important: “it triggers the power
to punish for false evidence and thus provides an incentive to truthful testimony”, further
11

It is worth noting that the 2015 Act s.74 provided that the Labour Court has the power to take evidence on oath.
Again, this stood in contrast to the 2015 Act’s provisions on proceedings before the Labour Court which “shall
be conducted in public unless the Labour Court, upon the application of a party to the appeal, determines that, due
to the existence of special circumstances, the proceedings (or part thereof) should be conducted otherwise than in
public”, s.44(7).
13
[2021] IESC 24, para.137.
14
This includes the power to disapply domestic legislation if considered incompatible with EU law, see the CJEU
judgment in Minister for Justice and Equality v Workplace Relations Commission [2019] 30 E.L.R. 57.
15
See fn.14. McKechnie J., while agreeing with O’Donnell J. that a legal qualification was not constitutionally
necessary to be appointed as an adjudication officer, was a little more circumspect in his views on the matter,
remarking: “As experience has shown, employment disputes can often involve difficult questions of law as well
as having to discern fact from non-fact, accuracy from inaccuracy and truth from un-truth. … I fully appreciate
why it may not be necessary on all occasions to have qualified lawyers determining such issues . However, the
availability of a panel of such persons would in my view be central to the legitimacy of the process… If a lawyer
is reasonably required, a lawyer should be appointed”, paras 138–139, per McKechnie J.
16
[2021] IESC 24, para.138.
17
[2021] IESC 24, para.147. On the matter of independence from the executive branch, see fn.56 below.
18
See fn.17.
12
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adding that the requirement “is an important part of ensuring that justice is done in cases where
there is serious and direct conflict of evidence”.19 For these reasons he found that the absence
of at least a capacity to allow the adjudication officer to require that certain evidence be given
on oath or affirmation was inconsistent with the Constitution.20
On the third ground, cross-examination, O’Donnell J. ultimately found that the absence of
a specific provision in the 2015 Act providing for cross-examination at adjudication was not
unconstitutional. Although he criticised the absence of such a provision as “unsatisfactory” in
circumstances where adjudication is “meant to be capable of being operated by persons without
any knowledge of the law, and for decisions to be made by persons without any broader legal
experience or training, even though they may have very detailed familiarity with the statutory
code in the field of employment law”, O’Donnell J. noted that the 2015 Act is presumed to be
constitutional, and also that the right to question and cross-examine witnesses was stated in a
guidance document on adjudication hearings, the Guidance Note for a WRC Adjudication
Hearing, suggesting the WRC did not preclude cross-examination where necessary. 21 This was
enough to satisfy O’Donnell J. that the absence of an express reference to cross-examination
in the 2015 Act itself did not render it unconstitutional. 22
On the fourth ground, public hearings, O’Donnell J. approached this question “through
the lens of Article 37”, which builds on the administration of justice as set out in Art.34.1, an
essential aspect of which is that hearings ought to be in public.23 Therefore, O’Donnell J.
reasoned, he could not “accept that there is a justification for a blanket prohibition on hearings
in public before the adjudication officer”.24 He outlined the reasons why public hearings are
important. In a narrower and practical sense, publicity may bring forward further relevant
evidence and witnesses, and allows a party to achieve public vindication, while in a broader
sense, publicity allows for scrutiny of the fairness, competence and efficiency of the decisionmaker. O’Donnell J. continued that, historically, public hearings “have been regarded as
fundamental to the administration of justice … a principle from which any exception must be
justified”.25 He brought home the significance of public justice by quoting Jeremy Bentham:
“[w]here there is no publicity there is no justice. Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the
keenest spur to exertion and the surest of all guards against improbity.” 26
Notably, however, O’Donnell J. curtailed this principled rhetoric by reflecting on the
reality and needs of parties appearing before adjudication officers at the WRC: “there is a
justification for calm, quiet, and private resolution of many disputes which may be of particular
sensitivity for the participants”, he observed. 27 As such, he suggested that public hearings were
by no means an absolute requirement and that it may be permissible to have a presumption in
favour of private hearings at first instance—it was just the absolute ban on public hearings that
meant that the 2015 Act fell foul of constitutional requirements.28

19

[2021] IESC 24, para.144, per O’Donnell J.
See fn.19. McKechnie J., concurring with O’Donnell J. on this point, expressed this in stronger terms: “the
absence of an express power to administer the oath is utterly lacking in constitutional compliance.” [2021] IESC
24, para.140, per McKechnie J.
21
[2021] IESC 24, para.146, per O’Donnell J.
22
Again, McKechnie J. concurring with O’Donnell J. on this point, was more forthright, finding that while the
Oireachtas’ failure to expressly make provision for cross-examination in the 2015 Act was not fatal, it was
“extremely difficult to understand”. [2021] IESC 24, para.141, per McKechnie J.
23
[2021] IESC 24, para.142, per O’Donnell J.
24
See fn.23.
25
See fn.23.
26
See fn.23.
27
[2021] IESC 24, para.143, per O’Donnell J.
28
See fn.27.
20
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These latter remarks are undoubtedly significant, affording wide discretion to legislators
on this important question, leaving them open to formulate amending legislation such that all
that is required is the possibility of public hearing in specific instances. 29 The approach of the
Oireachtas on this important matter is addressed below in Part 3.
All told, O’Donnell’s J. analysis of these aspects of Pt 4 of the 2015 Act was fairly critical
and pointed: the Oireachtas should not have legislated for WRC hearings to be automatically
heard in private. They ought to have made provision for evidence to be taken under oath or
affirmation, the absence of a specific provision for cross-examination of witnesses was
“unsatisfactory”, and the Government’s powers to remove adjudication officers and Labour
Court members or to decide not to renew their warrants of appointment was, at the very least,
concerning. The consequences of the Supreme Court’s decision are considered further in Part
3.
Part 2 describes the 2019 survey, its background and methodology and, following that,
outlines participating representatives’ views on the system.
2: THE 2019 SURVEY
The 2019 survey was the third in a series of survey studies investigating representatives’ views
on state-provided workplace dispute resolution services in Ireland. In 2011, the author
conducted the first survey of representatives, shortly before the Minister for Jobs, Enterprise
and Innovation, Richard Bruton TD, announced his intention to reform the system, which later
culminated in the 2015 Act. 30 The survey obtained the representatives’ views on the system in
operation then, and gathered their views on, and suggestions for, reform. The results
highlighted representatives’ widespread dissatisfaction with the complex and convoluted
system—one that almost all who partook agreed needed fundamental structural change.
The second 2016 survey was conducted in the aftermath of the reforms realised by the
2015 Act, one year on from the introduction of the two-tier system comprising the WRC and
the revised Labour Court. While the results demonstrated some improvement in the perception
of the overall structures, representatives nevertheless conveyed relatively high levels of
dissatisfaction with aspects of the Adjudication Service.
The third survey conducted in Autumn 2019 investigated representatives’ perceptions of
the current state of the workplace dispute resolution system in Ireland introduced by the 2015
Act after a period of four years’ operation. 31 The attitudes expressed in this 2019 survey,
therefore, perhaps paint a truer picture of the overall success or otherwise of the reform project
than the 2016 survey did. Views in the 2016 survey were expressed quite soon after the new
system’s introduction and may have reflected, at least to some extent, the inevitable teething
errors after such a fundamental overhaul. A clearer sense emerges from the 2019 survey on
whether the reformed system has achieved the Government’s stated objective upon their
announcement, to provide a “world-class workplace relations service”. 32

29

To some extent, although they came to opposite conclusions as to the constitutionality of s.41(13) of the 2015
Act, O’Donnell’s J. treatment of this issue squares up with the comments of Simons J. in the High Court that “the
general rule that justice must be administered in public should be considered incrementally … [t]he choice is not
a binary one between (i) a hearing fully in public, or (ii) one completely in camera” [2020] IEHC 178, para.206.
Simons J. ultimately concluded that the 2015 Act “achieves a compromise between publicity and privacy by
ensuring that the decisions must be published, albeit on an anonymised basis” [2020] IEHC 178, para.207.
30
Duffy (fn.2). Minister Bruton made this announcement at a High Level Conference, The Workplace Relations
Act 2015—One Year On, UCD Sutherland School of Law, 1 October 2016.
31
The survey was conducted in compliance with the author’s institutional ethical requirements.
32
Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation (fn.2). Charleton J. described this labelling as “hyperbolic” and
“unnecessary” given Ireland “is a first-world country” [2021] IESC 24, para.24.
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The methodology employed for the 2019 survey was the same as for the previous two
surveys, and targeted the same cohort: professional representatives who regularly represent
complainants and respondents in employment law and industrial relations disputes in Ireland
and who regularly appear before the relevant workplace dispute resolution bodies. This
included solicitors and barristers, trade union representatives and employer organisation
representatives. One hundred and four representatives responded to the 2019 survey,
comprising 30 barristers, 33 trade union representatives, 31 solicitors (seven of which were
working “in house”), seven employer organisation representatives and three others (two of
whom described themselves as HR consultants/professionals and one representative from an
NGO). Representatives were asked what type of client they generally represented: 34 identified
as representing a mix of workers and employers, 35 identified as generally representing
workers, and 35 identified as generally representing employers (six for employers mainly from
the public sector, 16 for employers mainly from the private sector, and 13 for employers from
both the private and public sectors). As such, the sample of representatives who participated in
the 2019 survey represented a broad and balanced cohort of the community of professional
representatives. 33
Like the previous two surveys, the 2019 survey was conducted through an online
questionnaire on Google Forms, and disseminated by email to members of the Employment
Law Association of Ireland, the Employment Bar Association, senior officials at Ibec, the Irish
Congress of Trade Unions and major trade unions. Representatives were informed of the
purpose of the study and guaranteed anonymity in their responses. 34 Survey questions either
used the Likert Scale method to ask representatives’ satisfaction or agreement levels with
particular statements or were open questions for them to comment in their own words on an
issue.
To turn to the results of the survey, in broad terms, the main findings were that while there
was something of an overall improvement in how representatives perceived the Irish workplace
dispute resolution system relative to the previous survey results, nevertheless representatives
reported persistent problems in how claims were processed and heard by the WRC at firstinstance—the subject matter of judicial scrutiny in Zalewski. At the appellate level, user
representatives appeared broadly satisfied with the Labour Court’s operations.
Perhaps the most significant result of the 2019 survey was that representatives were more
positively disposed towards the system than they had been both in the pre-reform era in 2011
and in the immediate aftermath of reforms in 2016. In 2019, 48 per cent of respondents were
either satisfied or very satisfied with the current system, compared to 31 per cent in the 2016
survey, and to just 11 per cent in the 2011 survey. Correspondingly, there was a decrease in
dissatisfaction: 34 per cent of respondents were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the system
in 2019, compared to 49 per cent in 2016 and 68 per cent in 2011. As such, the results pointed
to an increasingly positive perception of the overall system.
Breaking the 2019 survey results down by professional cohort, barristers and employer
representatives were particularly critical of the overall system. Broadly speaking, this mirrored
results from the 2016 survey where trade union representatives were generally more satisfied
than legal professional practitioners. Of the 30 responding barristers, 60 per cent were
33

By comparison, the 2011 survey generated 103 responses, while the 2016 survey generated 139 responses.
As a result, and necessarily, individual representatives’ results cannot be individually tracked across the three
surveys. The first of these studies was conducted as part of the author’s Ph.D. thesis with the School of Law,
Trinity College Dublin, Barry, “Reforming the Framework for Employment Litigation and Dispute Resolution in
Ireland” (fn.2). The 2016 survey was undertaken by the author and commissioned by the Employment Law
Association of Ireland, and the 2019 survey was conducted by the author in his capacity as a Lecturer in Law at
the School of Languages, Law and Social Sciences, Technological University Dublin.
34
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dissatisfied, while 23 per cent were satisfied. Of the seven employer organisation
representatives, five (or 72 per cent) were dissatisfied. By far the most positively-disposed
professional cohort were the 33 responding trade union representatives: 73 per cent satisfied
with the system, compared to just 9 per cent dissatisfied. Of the 31 solicitors, 45 per cent were
satisfied, 39 per cent were dissatisfied. Compared to the 2016 survey findings, this result was
a considerable improvement. In 2016, the 39 responding solicitors were very negatively
disposed to the overall system: 82 per cent were dissatisfied, just 10 per cent were satisfied.
That more solicitors were satisfied than dissatisfied in 2019 represents a significant change.
Respondents to the 2019 survey were also asked to compare the new system to the old one
if they had experience of such. Although there was an overall improvement when compared to
the results of an equivalent question in the 2016 survey, nevertheless, negative perceptions
remained stubbornly high. In the 2019 survey, 45 per cent of respondents who had experience
of both the old and new systems reported that the new system was either slightly or much better,
while 40 per cent reported that it was either slightly or much worse. This was a better
assessment than responses to the equivalent question in the 2016 survey where 34 per cent
thought the new system was slightly or much better, while 66 per cent reported that it was
slightly or much worse. Although a better reflection on the new system, nevertheless, that four
out of ten representatives felt it had disimproved four years on from the introduction of reforms
is telling and disappointing.
Breaking these results down into professional cohorts, once more barristers were
particularly negatively disposed. Out of 29 responding barristers, 79 per cent thought the new
system was either slightly or much worse than the old one, with just 14 per cent responding
that they thought the new system was either slightly or much better. On the other hand, 50 per
cent of the 30 responding solicitors preferred the new system to the old one, slightly more than
the 40 per cent who thought it was worse. Once more, trade union representatives were the
most positively disposed, with 55 per cent of the 31 responding trade union representatives
reporting that the new system was slightly or much better than the old one, compared to 23 per
cent who felt that the new system was slightly or much worse.
We now turn to results from the survey on four discrete areas under consideration: (i)
complaints management at the WRC, (ii) adjudication at the WRC, iii) mediation at the WRC
and (iv) operations at the Labour Court. Three of these four areas concern the WRC. Results
suggest that while user representatives’ perception of the competence of adjudication officers
has improved, substantial concerns remain, particularly regarding the consistency of approach
to hearings, the consistency of adjudication officers’ decisions, and how complaints are
processed at the pre-hearing stage. These concerns and issues were apparent in 2016 and
remained so in 2019.
(i) Complaints management at the WRC
Of the representatives, 49 per cent were dissatisfied with the administration, processing and
scheduling of complaints by the WRC, while 31 per cent were satisfied. This was a small
improvement on results to the same question in 2016 where 60 per cent were dissatisfied and
30 per cent were satisfied. Nevertheless, that seven out of ten responding representatives were
not satisfied is an undoubted cause for concern about how the WRC handles complaints at the
pre-hearing stage. Asked to comment on the pre-hearing stage, thematically, representatives
identified inflexibility and a lack of transparency in adjournments processes and dissatisfaction
with notice times for hearings as concerns. Some, for instance, reported that they were refused
adjournments when they were double-booked by the WRC. Asked to rate the method by which
adjournments are sought and granted by the WRC, 57 per cent said that this was poor or very
poor, while 16 per cent said that this was good or very good. This was a disimprovement on
9

the results to the equivalent question in 2016. Although there were some positive comments
about new procedures introduced by the WRC to process adjournments, 35 discontent on this
issue remained high, with representatives pointing to a lack of consistency and of clear
principles in granting adjournments.
On a more positive note, compared to commentary on the pre-hearing stage before the
WRC from the 2016 survey, there was a notable absence of negative comments about the
handling and exchange of documents between parties, and to adjudication officers. This was a
relatively common cause of complaint in the 2016 survey with many representatives
commenting on inconsistencies in how different adjudication officers approached the exchange
of documents at the pre-hearing stage. 36 A further positive was an improvement in satisfaction
ratings of communication and correspondence by the WRC to users before a hearing. In 2019,
46 per cent said it was good or very good, 18 per cent said it was poor or very poor, and 36 per
cent rated it average. This compared to 2016 when 34 per cent said it was good or very good,
38 per cent said it was poor or very poor, and 28 per cent said it was average. Particularly
positive, therefore, was that there was an improved perception among representatives of the
WRC’s communication and correspondence.
(ii) Hearings at the WRC
Representatives were asked for their views on the competence of adjudication officers. More
representatives were satisfied (47 per cent) than dissatisfied (31 per cent) with the competence
of adjudication officers, although not by much more than they had been in 2016 when 40 per
cent were satisfied compared to 31 per cent dissatisfied. In the 2019 survey, the majority of
representatives who were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the competence of adjudication
officers were barristers, making up 17 of the 32 barristers who took part in the survey or, in
percentage terms, 53 per cent. Among the 30 barristers who responded to this particular
question, just 23 per cent were satisfied, while 57 per cent were dissatisfied. This expression
of dissatisfaction contrasted with the views of solicitors—of the 31 solicitors who responded,
39 per cent were satisfied, while 26 per cent were dissatisfied. As such, barristers were
disproportionately dissatisfied with the competence of adjudication officers compared to other
professional cohorts.
Thirty-seven representatives responded with further comments on the general operation of
the Adjudication Service. Sixteen specifically commented negatively on the competence of
adjudication officers. Recurring themes were a variety and inconsistency in the quality of
adjudication officers, the inability of some to understand complex legal matters, and concerns
over inconsistencies and improper application in how the rules of evidence are applied during
hearings. These comments were mostly made by barristers or solicitors. That barristers were
disproportionately more likely to be dissatisfied than others is telling. This finding—reflecting
criticisms made by legal practitioners early on in the reform process—may stem from the
absence of a requirement to be legally qualified, or to have a minimum level of legal
professional practice experience to serve as an adjudication officer. 37 As detailed above, similar
arguments were made on the applicant’s behalf in Zalewski, citing this author’s 2016 survey,
which pointed to representatives’ dissatisfaction with the system as evidence that the absence
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The WRC published new guidelines on postponements on 1 July 2021, see
www.workplacerelations.ie/en/complaints_disputes/adjudication/postponement-policy/wrc-postponementguidelines.pdf [Accessed 9 August 2021].
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Barry, “Surveying the Scene: How Representatives’ Views Informed a New Era in Irish Workplace Dispute
Resolution” (fn.5) at 60.
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of a requirement to be legally qualified led to systemic problems. 38 However, as described
above, the Supreme Court decided that the absence of such requirements for appointment was
not unconstitutional.
As for how representatives rated the quality of adjudication officers’ rulings, perceptions
in 2019 were just marginally better than those expressed in 2016. In 2019, 38 per cent were
satisfied and 38 per cent were dissatisfied, while in 2016, 31 per cent were satisfied and 37 per
cent were dissatisfied.
Aside from the issue of competence of individual adjudication officers and the quality of
their rulings, representatives expressed strong, predominantly negative views on the
consistency of hearings before the WRC. Sixty-eight per cent disagreed that the format of
hearings before adjudication officers was consistent from hearing to hearing, while 26 per cent
agreed. Rather strikingly, this was a marginally worse result compared to 2016 when 63 per
cent disagreed and 26 per cent agreed. Therefore, the results suggest that inconsistencies of
approach at hearings cannot be attributable to an initial bedding-in period for the Adjudication
Service’s operations. That just over two out of three representatives believed adjudication
hearings were inconsistent four years on is undoubtedly a concern. Many of the 37 comments
on the Adjudication Service referred to inconsistency among adjudication officers and the
conduct of hearings, with some flagging differences in approach during hearings as between
mediative, inquisitorial and adversarial styles. Others highlighted variability in how rules of
evidence were applied. When viewed alongside the result to a separate, but related question—
that over half (54 per cent) of representatives are dissatisfied with the consistency of
adjudication officers’ rulings—the overall picture that these results paint is rather negative. The
possible reasons for inconsistencies at adjudication are explored in Part 3.
Overall, negative perceptions persisted regarding many aspects of the critical first-instance
Adjudication Service provided by the WRC. The results from the 2019 survey suggested that
there is a sizeable cohort of legal professional practitioners, particularly barristers, who
remained deeply concerned that adjudication at the Adjudication Service is characterised by
unpredictable and inconsistent procedures. Coupled with the finding that more experienced
practitioners’ perceived the new system as worse than the old one, it is reasonable to deduce
that at least some legal professional practitioners remain of the view that a more legal, courtlike forum at first instance presided over by legally qualified adjudicators is a preferable mode
of adjudication, particularly for the resolution of employment rights claims. These were
characteristics of the Employment Appeals Tribunal, where a legally qualified chair (or vicechair) presided over hearings as part of a tripartite panel. A further finding from the 2019 survey
lends weight to this suggestion: 58 per cent of 94 responding representatives (the majority of
them solicitors and barristers) expressed the view that adjudication officers were less
competent than members of the Employment Appeals Tribunal. 39 Twenty-nine per cent
expressed the view that adjudication officers were more competent than their predecessors on
the Employment Appeals Tribunal. The next section considers representatives’ views on the
WRC’s Mediation Service.
(iii) Views on the WRC’s Mediation Service
The WRC’s Mediation Service provides mediation in two main formats, telephone and faceto-face mediation, although telephone mediation is used much more often. Measured by case
volume alone, adjudication, rather than mediation, remains very much the dominant mode of
first-instance dispute resolution at the WRC. Mediation for employment rights issues is
38

O’Donnell J., [2020] IESC 24, para.18.
It is acknowledged, of course, that this ought to be considered a general impression, particularly given some
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dependent on submitting a claim to the Adjudication Service. The use of mediation and how it
is presented to users, and the propensity for disputes to be triaged to adjudication are themes
that will be returned to later in Part 3 of this article.
The 2019 survey asked representatives about their satisfaction with the general
effectiveness of the Mediation Service to resolve workplace disputes. More representatives
were dissatisfied (33 per cent) than were satisfied (26 per cent). Participants’ commentary on
the quality of the Mediation Service was quite polarised. When asked to provide general
additional comments on the Mediation Service, 30 representatives responded. Five remarked
that the face-to-face service was more useful than the telephone service. Seven representatives
expressed concerns about availability, some recounting instances when mediation was not
offered to them even after both parties requested it. Nevertheless, on this issue, there was
something of an improvement in representatives’ general views as to the availability of
mediation services relative to the 2016 survey. In 2019, 33 per cent were satisfied with the
availability of the WRC’s face-to-face mediation service while 25 per cent were dissatisfied—
an improvement on corresponding figures from 2016, when 27 per cent were satisfied and 34
per cent were dissatisfied. Nevertheless, despite the improvement, availability of mediation
appeared to remain a significant issue. Finally, two representatives commented that there was
not enough flexibility and creativity in terms of the agreements that WRC mediators propose.
The results from the 2019 survey suggest that the WRC Mediation Service is not running
optimally, and more could be done to improve both the effectiveness and availability of
appropriate mediation in the future. In Part 3, suggestions are made for how bolstering the
Mediation Service’s service delivery could improve outcomes for parties seeking first-instance
dispute resolution at the WRC.
(iv) Views on the Labour Court
The 2015 Act increased the Labour Court’s jurisdiction considerably. Since its introduction,
the Court has appellate jurisdiction over disputes under the full range of employment rights
legislation. 40
Broadly speaking, representatives’ satisfaction levels with the Labour Court expressed in
the 2019 survey were considerably higher than they were with the WRC. This mirrors a similar
trend from the 2016 survey. In the 2019 survey, 70 per cent expressed satisfaction with the
administration and processing of claims at the Labour Court. Just 15 per cent were dissatisfied.
These figures were broadly similar to those that the Labour Court enjoyed in the 2016 survey.
In the 2019 survey, 71 per cent were satisfied with the competence of the Labour Court while
21 per cent were dissatisfied. This compared to 59 per cent satisfied and 13 per cent dissatisfied
in the 2016 survey. Representatives in 2019 were generally satisfied with the quality of rulings
issued by the Court: 62 per cent satisfied, 22 per cent dissatisfied, compared to 59 per cent
satisfied and 12 per cent dissatisfied in 2016. 41 Representatives were also generally satisfied
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For discussion on the role of the Labour Court within the system, see Kerr (fn.2); Mallon, “Employment Law
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Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2015, see Naisiunta Leictreacht (NECI) v Labour Court [2021] IESC 36,
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with the consistency of the rulings made by the Labour Court: 61 per cent satisfied, 23 per cent
dissatisfied, compared to 58 per cent satisfied and 18 per cent dissatisfied in 2016. 70 per cent
of representatives agreed to some extent that the Labour Court had adapted well to its new
increased role as a full appellate court for employment rights issues, while 22 per cent
disagreed. In 2016, 56 per cent agreed while 20 per cent disagreed. It would appear then, that
representatives are broadly positive about their experiences of the Labour Court in recent years,
and more so than they were in 2016.
However, despite these positive results, 47 representatives provided additional, mostly
negative, comments on the Labour Court. Some 18 representatives commented variously on
some Labour Court members’ hostile, rude, aggressive, intemperate or ill-tempered manner.
These comments did not stem from one particular cohort, coming from representatives on both
sides of the industrial relations divide and from barristers, solicitors and trade union
representatives alike. Five representatives remarked that there was too much emphasis placed
on written rather than oral submissions in the decision-making process.
Reflecting on the results of the 2019 survey on the whole, it seems that the bulk of
representatives’ concerns and criticisms of the new system focus on how disputes are resolved
at first-instance at the WRC. Part 3 examines how the survey data can help to reflect on the
system’s successes and the ongoing challenges it faces, particularly in light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Zalewski, and how, consequently, the system may be best served by
recalibrating its first-instance dispute resolution offering by bolstering mediation, both in terms
of how it is presented to users and how it is delivered.
3. REFLECTIONS, ANALYSIS, AND DEVELOPING THE SYSTEM
The three surveys combine to form a longitudinal study over the last decade on representatives’
views on workplace dispute resolution services in Ireland at a time of fundamental change in
the system. On balance, the survey results suggest that the new system for resolving workplace
relations disputes is a significant improvement on the old one. They reflect gradual
improvement in some key areas over the first four years of its operations, although considerable
challenges remain.
Two successes stand out. First, the new system is undoubtedly far less convoluted and
confusing than the old one. The 2015 Act delivered a two-tier adjudication structure for
resolving workplace disputes, a structure that enjoyed representatives’ widespread support in
the 2011 survey before reforms were announced. 42 The system ensures that users and their
representatives now have a clearer path for resolving the vast majority of employment law and
industrial relations disputes. Confusion over the vast array of entry points for complainants,
duplication of claims to multiple agencies arising from the one set of circumstances, and forum
shopping that arose under the old system have been eradicated. 43
Secondly, delays that were pervasive in the old system are no longer common.44 Although
some suggest that delays can sometimes occur at various stages of dispute resolution processes
under the new system, and although the COVID-19 emergency caused difficulties in processing
determination not to block an unfair dismissal claim on procedural grounds, see The State of Kuwait v Kanj [2021]
IEHC 395.
42
Eighty-two per cent of representatives supported this model in the 2011 survey. The then-Chairman of the
Labour Court, commented in 2012 that, “[i]f there is one thing that every participant in the debate generated by
the Minister's proposals for reform of the employment rights adjudicative system appears to agree on, it is the
need for reform”. Duffy (fn.2) at 81.
43
This was reflected in evidence from a leading employment law practitioner on behalf of the applicant in Zalewski
who described the new system as a “tremendous advance” [2021] IESC 24, para.146, per O’Donnell J.
44
Thirteen representatives in the 2011 commented specifically on delays in the system then. Barry, “Surveying
the Scene: How Representatives’ Views Informed a New Era in Irish Workplace Dispute Resolution” (fn.5) at 53.
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complaints at the WRC, concerns about systemic delays are far fewer in number than they had
been previously.
Despite these successes, significant concerns remain among representatives with the
delivery of first-instance dispute resolution at the WRC. Most criticisms are directed towards
the Adjudication Service, with unpredictability and inconsistency, in how adjudication is
conducted, a dominant theme. These concerns overlap with the constitutional frailties identified
in Zalewski, although the survey results point to wider issues with how first-instance dispute
resolution operates.
What are the underlying reasons for representatives’ negative views on the Adjudication
Service? First, the wording in the 2015 Act that prescribes what an adjudication officer does,
s.41(5)(a), is important because it provides context for the criticisms of inconsistency and
unpredictability at hearings:
“An adjudication officer to whom a complaint or dispute is referred under this section
shall—
(i) inquire into the complaint or dispute,
(ii) give the parties to the complaint or dispute an opportunity to—
(I) be heard by the adjudication officer, and
(II) present to the adjudication officer any evidence relevant to the complaint or
dispute,
(iii) make a decision in relation to the complaint or dispute in accordance with the
relevant redress provision, and
(iv) give the parties to the complaint or dispute a copy of that decision in writing.”
To summarise then, an adjudication officer’s basic duties are to inquire into the matter,
hear the parties and allow them to present evidence, make a decision and give it to the parties
in writing. The approach taken by the legislators is streamlined—perhaps a deliberate policy
decision to diverge from the formalities of traditional court settings governed by extensive
court rules of procedure. Layered onto the streamlined legislative framework is the WRC’s
Guidance Note for a WRC Adjudication Hearing, a “general guide for the structure and
procedure of a WRC Adjudication Hearing”, first published in October 2017.45 Notably, the
Guidance Note opens with a statement that emphasises the substantial discretion adjudication
officers have when conducting hearings: “[i]t is a matter for the Adjudication Officer to run
the hearing/investigation as appropriate for the circumstances of the case and in accordance
with fair procedures.” As for how oral argument is conducted and how evidence is heard, the
Guidance Note states at 6.3 that an adjudication officer “will take direct evidence from both
parties and all other relevant witnesses, if required” [emphasis added], while at 6.4, “[t]he other
party, or their representative, will be given the opportunity to question the parties and other
witnesses regarding the evidence they have given.” The overall tenor of the guidelines seems
to facilitate, if not emphasise adjudication officers’ considerable discretion in how they run
hearings.
Contrast this to equivalent 2015 Guidelines issued by the Employment Appeals Tribunal
(EAT), the WRC’s predecessor for adjudicating the majority of termination of employment
disputes. The EAT guidelines specifically stated that “rules of evidence are applied in the
taking [sic] the parties’ evidence” [emphasis added]. It set out that witnesses give direct
evidence to the Tribunal (in general, under oath, for unfair dismissals cases), the other side then
45
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engages in cross-examination, and if new matters arise, re-examination can take place. 46 The
EAT’s guidelines were, therefore, considerably more prescriptive than the WRC’s.
Some degree of flexibility of approach is desirable because the WRC necessarily has to
cater for a very wide range of dispute types with different characteristics and qualities. To
illustrate, a worker’s complaint of not having received a written contract of employment is not
the same, nor nearly as complex, as another worker’s complaint of constructive dismissal
coupled with an allegation of sexual harassment by a colleague. One senior official from the
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, appearing before an Oireachtas committee
addressing the need for amending legislation after the Zalewski judgment, remarked that the
WRC is a “very unique place” that must deal with “very simple matters and very complex
matters and what we are trying to do is find the right balance whereby we are ensuring the
administration of justice, that fairness is at the heart of it, that it is transparent and of a standard
but at the same time it does not become a ten-year process”. 47 As O’Donnell J. noted in
Zalewski, the WRC is trying “… to pursue the desirable objective of having any disputes
resolved as speedily, cheaply, and informally as possible, and without the aspects of court
proceedings which might be considered unnecessary and, in some cases, intimidating and
inhibitory”. 48
However, with flexibility and informality come concerns—among solicitors and barristers,
in particular—about inconsistency and unpredictability at adjudication. The potential for such
difficulties was flagged before the 2015 Act was passed. As the Workplace Relations Bill 2014
went through the Oireachtas, prominent employment law practitioners criticised its text on
aspects of adjudication. Tom Mallon B.L. noted the “total lack of detail” in how hearings were
to be conducted,49 while Marguerite Bolger S.C. flagged that there seemed to be an emphasis
on adjudication possessing an inquisitorial, rather than an adversarial quality. 50 Bolger argued
that, while an inquisitorial approach may be suitable for resolving industrial relations disputes,
it “may not be so effective in dealing with the blatant conflicts of fact which can and do arise
in employment law disputes”. 51 These comments were prescient, given the views expressed in
both the 2016 and the 2019 surveys about inconsistencies and unpredictability in the
adjudication process. In a similar vein, Bolger’s criticism that the 2015 Act’s provision for
adjudication may be in breach of constitutional and ECHR rights also proved prophetic in light
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Zalewski. 52
Aside from the broadly-framed wording of the 2015 Act and the WRC Guidelines that
followed, another reason for inconsistency and unpredictability at adjudication may be
adjudication officers relying on previous experiences and modes of adjudicating at the old
dispute resolution bodies in which they served. In 2015, adjudicators from each of the old
46
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dispute resolution bodies—each with its own practices and procedures, and culture of dispute
resolution—transitioned to their new role as adjudication officers at the WRC. Commenting
on the WRC’s operations one year after its commencement in 2016, the then Director General
of the WRC, Oonagh Buckley, remarked that the experiences and skills adjudication officers
had acquired in the adjudicative bodies in which they had previously served “naturally inform
how they go about their day to day work in the independent performance of their duties. We
must respect that independence”. 53 Notwithstanding that, she agreed that the WRC ought to
work with adjudication officers towards “a consistent and predictable approach to the
management of hearings.” 54 Despite these commitments, survey responses taken three years
later in 2019 suggest that such efforts have not worked—all the more surprising, perhaps, given
an influx of newly-appointed adjudication officers between 2016 and 2019, and the expectation
that procedures and practices at adjudication would have homogenised to a greater extent.
Where to next for the WRC and how can it improve its services to users? Critically, how
can the WRC safeguard constitutional justice, while affording users a flexible and costeffective means of resolving their dispute? O’Donnell J. captured the inherent tension in what
the WRC is trying to achieve: “[I]f the policy of informality and the rejection of expensive and
potentially cumbersome legal procedures becomes a rejection of the law and those features of
procedure necessary for a fair determination, then there is an unavoidable, and fatal, clash.” 55
The Zalewski decision presents an opportunity for the WRC to evolve and to improve its
dispute resolution offering. The first, and most pressing, milestone, of course, is amending
legislation to address the constitutional frailties identified in Zalewski, the Workplace Relations
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021.
The Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021 (“the 2021 Act”) was first
published on 24 June 2021, proceeded through the legislative stages at a fast pace, and was
signed into law by the President on 22 July. It directly addresses the constitutional
shortcomings of adjudication at the WRC identified in Zalewski. It grants adjudication officers
the power to provide for the administration of oaths or affirmations and for adjudication
hearings to be heard in public by default, subject to exceptions. The 2021 Act also sets
parameters on the Government’s powers to appoint and revoke the appointment of adjudication
officers, 56 for the anonymisation of parties in published decisions of adjudication officers in
certain circumstances, and provides that applications to the District Court in relation to the
enforcement of decisions of adjudication officers shall be made on notice.57
To focus on those provisions that directly address the declarations of unconstitutionality
in Zalewski, the 2021 Act’s provisions for oaths or affirmations are straightforward. Section 4
of the 2021 Act amends the 2015 Act at s.41(12A) by providing that an adjudication officer
may require a person giving evidence in adjudication proceedings “to give such evidence on
oath or affirmation and, for that purpose, cause to be administered an oath or affirmation to
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such person”. 58 It further provides for substantial criminal penalties for persons making
statements material in the proceedings that are, and that they know to be, false. 59
As regards the provision for adjudication hearings to be conducted in public, s.4 of the
2021 Act replaces s.41(13) of the 2015 Act that the Supreme Court in Zalewski declared
unconstitutional insofar as it provided that hearings were to be conducted otherwise than in
public. It amends s.41(13) of the 2015 Act such that it prescribes that adjudication hearings
shall be heard in public, subject to a broadly framed qualification that an adjudication officer
may determine, upon a motion or application by a party, that “due to the existence of special
circumstances” all or part of the proceedings “should be conducted otherwise than in public”.
Section 4 of the 2021 Act also provides equivalent criteria regarding the publication of
decisions and the identification of parties involved. By default, every decision shall be
published on the internet subject to the adjudication officer’s discretion to anonymise parties
in published decisions by inserting the following wording into the 2015 Act at s.41(14): “an
adjudication officer may determine that, due to the existence of special circumstances,
information that would identify the parties in relation to whom the decision was made should
not be published by the Commission”. 60
The provision regarding hearings in public or private mirrors the provision for the conduct
of hearings in the Labour Court in public by default, subject to the same exception. Although
the legislative approach taken is like-for-like, it should be noted that the WRC and Labour
Court operate in very different contexts. Firstly, the vast majority of complaints begin and end
at the WRC, rather than proceed to appeal before the Labour Court. The issue of whether
hearings ought to be heard in public or in private will therefore undoubtedly arise far more
often at the WRC than it will at the Labour Court. Every party who wishes to engage with stateprovided adjudication will weigh up the prospect of public scrutiny of their matter, not just
those who seek to appeal a decision to the Labour Court.
Secondly, the Labour Court operates as a tripartite panel, and as such its three members
can—at least in theory, if not in practice—make the call together on whether there are special
circumstances to host the hearing in private. An adjudication officer, on the other hand, must
make such a call alone on what amounts to “special circumstances” for the hearing to be
conducted otherwise than in public.
Thirdly, then, what amounts to “special” circumstances, both in the context of deciding to
host hearings in private and in the context of anonymising parties’ involvements in any decision
that is published? It is worth noting that the legislators did not choose “exceptional” or
“extraordinary” circumstances as the requisite threshold. Perhaps by setting the threshold to
“special” circumstances rather than to a higher threshold, this envisages private hearings
becoming relatively common case—indeed, as previously noted above, O’Donnell J. observed
that it may even be permissible to have a presumption in favour of private hearings. However,
during a Dáil debate on this subsection, Minister of State, Damien English T.D., gave some
indication as to what was envisaged by “special circumstances”, suggesting that they would
58
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arise in instances “such as cases involving a minor, a sensitive health or other social matter,
sexual harassment or protected disclosures”. 61 It seems, then, that a complainant would not
meet the threshold simply by expressing concern that, if their name is in the public domain as
having taken a complaint to the WRC, this could potentially damage their future employment
prospects. The Minister of State rejected an amendment tabled by four Sinn Féin senators to
require the WRC not to publish parties’ names where it would detrimentally impact on their
securing employment in the future. He dismissed such concerns: public hearings at the WRC
“would not deter employees bringing cases forward” and “[a]ny decent employer will not hold
it against a potential employee who took a case to the WRC to vindicate his or her rights under
our employment law”, he contended.62 At the very least, it remains to be seen whether this is
an overly optimistic view. At worst, some workers may well decide that “going public” to have
their employment rights vindicated is simply not worth the risk of possibly damaging their
career prospects. Or vice versa, an employer facing a spurious complaint from an unjustifiably
disgruntled worker may decide to cut their losses and reach a settlement to avoid any
reputational damage occasioned by a public hearing.
Whatever the case, where one party seeks a private hearing and the other contests this,
there are, at present, no criteria other than “special circumstances” for an adjudication officer
on which to base their decision. The 2021 Act appears to have been left deliberately openended. The Minister of State emphasised the importance of adjudication officers’ discretion in
this regard, in response to concerns from both T.D.s and Senators. 63 He said that more detail
and guidance will follow in the form of regulations and WRC guidelines. 64 Regulations, at a
minimum, will be necessary. If prescribing factors for determining what amounts to “special
circumstances” is left to guidelines alone, this approach would arguably be tantamount to the
approach O’Donnell J. highlighted as “unsatisfactory” in his judgment in Zalewski, albeit in a
separate context—that cross-examination was not expressly provided for in the 2015 Act itself
and, instead, was left to be provided for through guidelines. 65
The circumstances in which hearings will be heard in public or private, and whether parties
will be publicly identified, are issues that are probably as significant as cross-examination.
Adjudication officers will inevitably be asked, time and again, to make these important and
contentious calls that may often make the difference between parties deciding to pursue or
defend a claim or leave it be. From the legislation, there is little to go on. Further clarity on
what factors an adjudication officer ought to consider in determining whether “special
circumstances” exist will undoubtedly be necessary, to ensure that such decisions will be made
robustly and consistently, and that inconsistencies and unpredictability do not arise. Otherwise,
as one Dáil Deputy suggested, “[w]e would cause a bigger problem than we are trying to fix”.66
It remains to be seen whether problems may arise, depending on the approach taken when the
2021 Act comes into operation.
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Reframing dispute resolution at the WRC
Aside from addressing the immediate constitutional frailties identified in Zalewski through the
Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021, the broader question is how the
overall system for resolving workplace disputes can be improved. The longitudinal data
presented by the three surveys are useful in this regard. As detailed above, debate and criticism
around the new system have to date predominantly focused on how WRC adjudication hearings
are conducted, and the inconsistency and unpredictability that has arisen. The problem may be
an over-reliance on adjudication, and the key to improving how disputes are resolved at first
instance by the WRC may be to widen the lens, to investigate how the WRC can better harness
the potential of its full suite of dispute resolution mechanisms beyond merely the Adjudication
Service. Those tasked with reforming the system and drafting the 2015 Act were doubtless
aware of the potential that other dispute resolution mechanisms had for resolving workplace
disputes, alongside adjudication. However, it seems that rather than harnessing the 2015 Act’s
“omnibus procedures which apply to a whole spectrum of decision-making” (as Simons J. put
it in his High Court judgment in Zalewski) to the fullest extent, many disputes may end up at
the Adjudication Service too readily, rather than being triaged elsewhere, or at least without
due consideration being given to other modes of dispute resolution. 67
The unique characteristics of the WRC’s workload, the full gamut of dispute types it must
deal with, and the entirely laudable aim of providing flexibility to service users and informal
channels for resolving their disputes, all point to the benefits of not only providing, but fully
resourcing a multi-faceted, and multi-service dispute resolution offering to parties who come
to the WRC. The 2015 Act provides for such a structure, but whether by accident or design or
owing to the legacy of pre-existing fora for resolving workplace disputes, service users and
their representatives predominantly converge on adjudication.
Breaking down the number of complaints before the WRC that are triaged to the different
dispute resolution services is revealing. Adjudication is still very much the order of the day,
bearing the burden of users’ demands for a service to resolve their dispute. In 2019, the number
of adjudications heard (5,009) amounted to about five times that of disputes that proceeded to
full mediation (1,024). Of those 1,024 mediation processes, just 240 were face-to-face
mediations, proportionately about 5 per cent of the total number of adjudication hearings in the
same year. Equivalent figures for 2020 were highly skewed owing to the COVID-19 pandemic,
with a hugely reduced number of adjudication hearings taking place, 1,899, owing to the forced
postponement of hearing dates at various points during the year; 582 complaints proceeded to
full mediation, 14 per cent of which were held face-to-face (circa 74 complaints), 85 per cent
via telephone and the remainder (a handful it would seem) conducted virtually. A table
detailing the number of face-to-face mediations from the calendar years 2016 to 2020 is set out
below.
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
69
197
603 (This figure 240
74 69
includes
363
identical cases
with a single
employer).[68]
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In his decision in Zalewski, O’Donnell J. spoke of how many parties presenting before the
WRC seek “calm, quiet, and private resolution” of their dispute. 70 Perhaps the best place for
calm, quiet and private resolution is very often at the Mediation Service, rather than at the
Adjudication Service. As such, solutions may come from within the WRC and within the
already established parameters of the 2015 Act. It may be a matter of emphasis and resourcing,
while preserving the general structure of the 2015 Act and the WRC’s dispute resolution
offerings.
Before considering this further, it is important to acknowledge that mediation is not a
panacea for all disputes and that adjudication is a necessary and fundamental part of the system.
For many disputing parties—whether out of intransigence, a complete breakdown in a work
relationship, or owing to the legal complexity of their claim—adjudication may be the only
feasible option for resolving the dispute. However, representatives’ criticisms in the 2019
survey, in particular, of inconsistency and unpredictability at adjudication may partly be a byproduct of adjudication officers’ efforts to provide for flexibility and informality in a forum
that is over-relied upon, one that is unnecessarily perceived as the “go-to” option for users and
their representatives in many instances. Indeed, some representatives, lamenting inconsistency
at adjudication hearings, pointed to some adjudication officers’ mediative style.
Flexible and informal dispute resolution can be provided for by the WRC elsewhere,
through a fully-resourced, properly presented Mediation Service, while ensuring that
adjudication remains available but is used appropriately.
The data on case throughput at the WRC highlight the propensity for complaints to go to
adjudication. Mediation is a relatively uncommon avenue, and where it does occur, the vast
majority of mediation is conducted through the telephone service. On the numbers alone, it
may well be argued that the Mediation Service is underused, and perhaps, as some have
suggested, under-resourced. 71 The WRC ought to consider ways to bolster its Mediation
Service to make it a mainstay mechanism for resolving disputes for more users of the WRC.
This involves a detailed consideration of how it is presented to potential users, and the
substance and modes of delivering mediation and the concomitant increase in resources that
may be required.
Encouragingly, this appears to be on the agenda. The WRC proposes to undertake a
consultation process with its stakeholders to establish what informs parties’ decisions to make
use of mediation and what changes the WRC might introduce to increase usage of the service. 72
Some brief comparisons with other jurisdictions are worth considering. In Britain
disputing parties must contact the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (Acas) before
an Employment Tribunal claim (the British equivalent of the WRC Adjudication Service) can
be lodged. Acas has a statutory duty to offer the services of a Conciliator to explain and offer
Early Conciliation to the parties for an initial period of up to one calendar month. The
Conciliator has the discretion to extend that by two weeks if both parties agree that extra time
may help resolution.
In New Zealand, the Employment Relations Authority (the equivalent of the WRC there)
must first consider whether mediation has been used by disputing parties. By default, the
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Authority must direct the parties to the Authority’s mediation service, unless the Authority
considers that mediation will not contribute constructively to resolving the matter, or will not
be in the public interest, or will undermine the urgent or interim nature of the proceedings, or
will be otherwise impractical or inappropriate in the circumstances. There is also a legal
obligation on parties to comply with a direction to mediation and attempt in good faith to reach
an agreed settlement of their differences.
In both jurisdictions, then, mediation is not prescribed as an alternative to adjudication,
but rather, adjudication is prescribed as an alternative to mediation. The default dispute
resolution mode is the reverse. By contrast, mediation for employment rights issues at the WRC
is, as they describe in their own words, “dependent on submitting a claim to the Adjudication
Service”. 73
What lessons can be learned from these jurisdictions? Both the British and New Zealand
systems are designed to funnel claims into mediation as a first step, with adjudication the next
step to be considered afterwards. Recalibrating the WRC such that parties are mandated to go
to mediation may not be viable under the terms of the 2015 Act, and could conceivably be
viewed as a barrier to parties’ constitutional right of access to justice (recall that the Supreme
Court decided in Zalewski that the Adjudication Service administers justice under a
combination of Arts 34 and 37). 74 Moreover, mandatory mediation may not be desirable:
mediation experts often view voluntary participation as integral to its viability and success. 75
However, to turn to how mediation is presented: first, the WRC could recalibrate how it
frames its two primary dispute resolution services—mediation and adjudication—to service
users. They ought to be perceived by users and representatives as being of equal standing with
each other, with one no more a default dispute resolution mechanism than the other. Although
one cannot be entirely definitive about this, mediation at the WRC may currently be viewed by
some users and representatives as something of a “boxed-off” category of dispute resolution, a
secondary option, one that is couched as an “alternative dispute resolution” in the literal sense
of the word and nothing more, rather than a mainstay dispute resolution mechanism in the way
that adjudication is. Indeed, that access to mediation for employment rights disputes is
contingent on filing a complaint to the Adjudication Service in the first place renders it an
alternative, rather than as a standalone dispute resolution offering.
Aside from consulting with stakeholders, the WRC could draw from literature on the
behavioural sciences, particularly nudge theory, pioneered by Richard Thaler and Cass
Sunstein, to investigate behavioural reasons why users and their representatives may be
inclined to opt for adjudication rather than mediation and to design behavioural interventions
to present the Mediation Service as more than a mere secondary alternative to adjudication. 76
Concepts from this field may help to explore why parties, and their influential representatives,
may over-rely on adjudication rather than on mediation. For instance, one might hypothesise
that status quo bias (the propensity to stick to default options—adjudication seemingly the
default dispute resolution option at the WRC), overconfidence bias (being unrealistically
optimistic about predicting one’s prospects, say, one’s chances of success at adjudication) and
salience bias (making decisions based on what is familiar and visible—the WRC Adjudication
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Service is the salient, touchstone forum for resolving workplace disputes in Ireland), may all
have a bearing on users’ and their representatives’ choices. 77 Consequently, many may opt for
adjudication rather than pursue mediation even when adjudication may not be the most useful
and cost-effective choice for them.
Aside from how the WRC presents its mediation offering, it ought to consider the
substance of its mediation offering and to explore ways to improve the Service’s dynamism
and attractiveness to users and their representatives. When mediation is made available (and it
is worth noting that some respondents to the 2016 and 2019 surveys remarked that they were
not offered mediation, even when both parties asked for it), as noted above, respondents seemed
to view face-to-face mediation more favourably than the telephone mediation service. The
apparent reliance on telephone mediation over face-to-face mediation is, therefore, striking, as
is the almost entire absence of employing online video conferencing technology, an avenue
that at the very least ought to be considered further, particularly in light of its normalisation
during the COVID-19 pandemic. Some mediators suggest virtual mediation, and some of the
features available through online video conferencing platforms, have advantages over inperson mediation. For example, the breakout rooms function on online video conferencing
platforms can be useful for shuttle diplomacy. 78 Further resources in terms of budget, ICT,
personnel, or otherwise would become necessary. But it would be a cost worth bearing.
Mediation is, by its nature, a more malleable dispute resolution technique for workplace
disputes than adjudication.79 Mediators can adapt their strategic approach to mediation to cater
for the dispute at hand. 80 Certainly, mediators can operate with more flexibility and discretion
than adjudicators can, given the nature of mediation and given the constitutionally necessary
constraints on how adjudication officers ought to conduct hearings following the Supreme
Court’s decision in Zalewski. Mediators can on the one hand be more evaluative and forthright
in their assessment of the dispute where necessary, or facilitative on the other, eliciting
resolutions to the dispute from the parties themselves, perhaps working towards creative
resolutions that preserve or even improve workplace relationships. Through in-depth,
comprehensive mediation sessions and processes, users may feel that their case has been
properly oxygenated and that their rights and duties as workers and employers alike have been
considered in a nuanced, and meaningful way. Mediation can also lead to bespoke resolutions
that may not be available through adjudication.
Indeed, mediation has been employed in the context of resolving employment rights
disputes in Ireland before, and according to users, very successfully. The Mediation Service
that operated at the Equality Tribunal operated on a face-to-face basis from 2000 until the
introduction of the new system. A survey of its users in 2009 demonstrated overwhelming
endorsement for the Service with over 90 per cent of users rating the Mediation Officer’s

77

See further on how these behavioural effects can affect choosing mediation as a dispute resolution option,
Charmaine Yun Ning Yap, “What’s in a Nudge? How Choice Architecture Surrounding Dispute Resolution
Options can Increase Uptake of Mediation” (2019) 4 Contemporary Issues in Mediation 13.
78
See, for example, Giuseppe Leonne, founder of Virtual Mediation Lab’s demonstration of break-out rooms in
the online video conferencing platform Zoom as a tool for shuttle diplmacy in online mediation, How Shuttle
Diplomacy Works in Online Mediation via Zoom, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=9_kx-MiPcwQ
[Accessed 9 August 2021].
79
On the nature of workplace mediation, and the competencies, skills and behaviours of effective workplace
mediators, see Brian Barry and others, “Shaping the Agenda 1: Exploring the Competencies, Skills and
Behaviours of Effective Workplace Mediators” [2016] Kennedy Institute Workplace Mediation Research Group.
80
Elsewhere, the author presents a framework for mediators to determine mediation strategy in workplace disputes
depending on the nature of the dispute (the type of dispute, the relationship between the parties, the outcome
agenda of the dispute all being factors). See Brian Barry, “A Strategy Model for Workplace Mediation Success”
(2021) 6 Mediation Theory and Practice (forthcoming).

22

fairness to both sides, the clarity of mediation guidelines, and their overall satisfaction with the
Service as either “good” or “very good”. 81
For a bolstered role to be given to the WRC’s Mediation Service, and for it to enjoy wider
success, would, of course, demand the confidence and buy-in from representatives from
different professional backgrounds, legal practitioners or otherwise. Clear policies and
guidelines to representatives on how mediation sessions will be conducted ought to be
provided. Again, messaging and presentation are key. It is worth noting that representatives
who responded to the 2011 survey, before the reforms were introduced, were well disposed
towards the introduction of mediation or other alternative dispute resolution service as a
mainstream means of first-instance dispute resolution: 69 per cent agreed or strongly agreed
with the proposal, 15 per cent disagreed, while 16 per cent expressed no opinion. As the 2019
survey indicated, however, representatives’ views on the Mediation Service in its current guise
are mixed.
If the WRC were to bolster how it presents its Mediation Service and its modes of delivery,
this may help to ensure that informality and flexibility are embedded within the system as a
viable mainstream option, while at the same time, the necessary and appropriately rigorous
standards of constitutional justice could be provided for through adjudication.
Notwithstanding all of the above, and to reemphasise, the Adjudication Service should of
course necessarily remain fully available to those who will need it. A granular approach where
a complaint gives rise to more than one issue can be taken. Complaints comprising multiple
issues can be bifurcated between the two services. 82
The Adjudication Service should continue to serve as a cornerstone of the WRC’s dispute
resolution offering, and although it need not mimic an ordinary court, the “standard of justice”
administered by it and now confirmed as falling under Art.37, cannot, as O’Donnell J. stated,
“be lower or less demanding than the justice administered in [ordinary] courts under Article
34”. 83 The standard of processes that an adjudication officer is required to uphold, therefore,
must not dip below that which would be expected in any ordinary court. With that requirement
comes, perhaps, a necessary degree of rigour in terms of procedure, and a concomitant degree
of formality, not to mention public scrutiny given that the default will be that hearings will be
conducted in public. This more rigorous procedural approach will likely afford prospective
users of adjudication some degree of certainty. In his judgment, MacMenamin J. put it simply:
“[P]arties are entitled to know, in advance, the rules of procedure to be applied prior to
embarking on a hearing.” 84
Consequently, the Mediation Service, through better presentation and bolstered resources,
including more reliance on face-to-face mediations and more use of online video-conferencing
technology rather than on telephone mediation, could serve as a more meaningful counterpart
and foil to adjudication than it has done to date (and vice versa), thereby ensuring that it
provides the flexible and informal dispute resolution avenue that many users may seek when
they come to the WRC, while, between them, mediation and adjudication can properly cater
for the full gamut of disputes.
What is suggested here does not require any overhaul to the legislative framework set out
in the 2015 Act, nor is the proposal geared towards purposefully funnelling users away from
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getting a ruling from the Adjudication Service when they need it. Rather, it is to better harness
the true potential of its Mediation Service which, to date, the survey data would suggest, has
perhaps not fully met expectations. The inconsistency and unpredictability at adjudication, and
the procedural problems that the Supreme Court in Zalewski identified, are perhaps indicators
that adjudication is too often relied upon. More parties, instead, ought to benefit from mediation
and the informality, flexibility and sometimes creativity that comes with resolving disputes
through it. This will, by extension, facilitate adjudication officers to deal with the proportion
of complaints that demand more formality owing to their factual or legal complexity or
otherwise in a more predictable and consistent manner. The range and differing nature of
workplace disputes that present to the WRC lend themselves to this dual offering. Finally, as
workplace dispute resolution in Ireland evolves, the insights of the community of legal
practitioners and other professional representatives, as the survey data has demonstrated over
the years, offer unique and valuable perspectives into operations on the ground. They ought to
continue to have a say on the system’s ongoing development.
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